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Scientific Workflow Integrity with Pegasus
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GOALS
Provide additional assurances that a scientific 
workflow is not accidentally or maliciously 
tampered with during its execution
Allow for detection of modification to its data or 
executables at later dates to facilitate 
reproducibility.
Integrate cryptographic support for data integrity 
into the Pegasus Workflow Management 
System.
cacr.iu.edu/projects/swip/
Our Talk
● Problem Statement: 
Challenges to Data Integrity
● Our Approach: Adding integrity 
support to the popular Pegasus 
scientific workflow management 
system
● Challenges
● Next steps
cacr.iu.edu/projects/swip/
Data Integrity: Seal ~ Signature ~ Authenticity ~ Trust
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Q: How does one “sign” digital data?
By Ipankonin - Vectorized from SVG 
elements from, Public Domain, 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index
.php?curid=1831846
Public Domain, 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=662341
cacr.iu.edu/projects/swip/
Data Integrity
Important in Business, Arts, Politics, Science, ...
Media Digitization 
and Preservation
FAKE NEWS!
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/science/2015-climate-study-data.html 
Reproducible 
Results
Former NOAA Scientist 
Confirms Colleagues 
Manipulated Climate Records
https://science.house.gov/news/press-releases/former-noaa-scientist-confirms-colleagues-m
anipulated-climate-records 
vs.
cacr.iu.edu/projects/swip/
Our Focus: Science
    “Scientific Workflow Integrity with Pegasus”
Modern day [computational] science uses workflows 
extensively. One popular workflow management 
system (WMS) used by several NSF projects is 
Pegasus. A WMS allow scientists to describe their 
process in a human-friendly way and then the software 
handles the details of the processing, dealing with 
tedious and repetitive steps and handling errors.
https://pegasus.isi.edu/ 
https://github.com/pegasus-isi/pegasus 
cacr.iu.edu/projects/swip/
Challenges to Scientific Data Integrity
Modern IT systems are not 
perfect - errors creep in.
At modern “Big Data” sizes 
we are starting to see 
checksums breaking down.
Plus there is the threat of 
intentional changes: 
malicious attackers, insider 
threats, etc.
cacr.iu.edu/projects/swip/
CERN Study of 
Disk Errors
Examined Disk, Memory, RAID 5 
errors.
“The error rates are at the 10-7 level, 
but with complicated patterns.” E.g. 
80% of disk errors were 64k regions of 
corruption.
Explored many fixes and their often 
significant performance trade-offs.
https://indico.cern.ch/event/13797/contributions/1362288/attachments/115080/163419/Data_integrity_v3.pdf 
cacr.iu.edu/projects/swip/
Network Corruption
Network router software inadvertently corrupts 
TCP data and checksum!
XSEDE and Internet2 example from 2013.
Second similar case in 2017 example with 
FreeSurfer/Fsurf project.
https://www.xsede.org/news/-/news/item/6390
Brocade TSB 2013-162-A
cacr.iu.edu/projects/swip/
Software failure
Bug in StashCache data transfer 
software would occasionally cause 
silent failure (failed but returned 
zero).
Internal to the workflow this was 
detected when input to a stage of the 
workflow was detected as corrupted 
and retry invoked. (60k retries and an 
extra 2 years of cpu hours!)
However, failures in the final staging 
out of data were not detected 
because their was no workflow next 
stage to catch the errors.
The workflow management system, 
believing workflow was complete, 
cleaned up, so final data incomplete 
and all intermediary data lost. Ten 
CPU*years of computing came to 
naught.
cacr.iu.edu/projects/swip/
Malicious attacks
● Script kiddies out for glory.
● Nation-states trying to disrupt/embarrass U.S. science.
● Disgruntled insiders.
● Grad students, post-docs, staff going for that 
publication with (bogus) phenomenal results. 
cacr.iu.edu/projects/swip/
Enter application-level checksums
Application-level checksums 
address these and other issues 
(e.g. malicious changes).
In use by many data transfer 
applications: scp, 
Globus/GridFTP, some parts of 
HTCondor, etc.
To include all aspects of the 
application workflow, requires 
either manual application by a 
researcher or integration into the 
application(s).
cacr.iu.edu/projects/swip/
Some background
Hash function - a mathematical/algorithmic function 
that takes a set of bits (of any length) and maps them to 
another set of (hopefully unique) bits of fixed length.
→ primary purpose: detect changes in data
e.g. using a SHA in Python:
>>> hashlib.sha256(b"The Answer to the Ultimate Question of Life, the Universe, and Everything is 42").hexdigest()
'8a72856cf94464dd641f0a2620ab604dd7a3f50293784a3a399acf6dc5b651cb'
>>> hashlib.sha256(b"The Answer To the Ultimate Question of Life, the Universe, and Everything is 42").hexdigest()
'a39be9fd272f2569aa95a07134a55f032ecb5c51cef6d66fe4032ec30bf4f1b6'
>>> hashlib.sha256(b"The Answer is 42").hexdigest()
'cbf296e175f02156cd60d6bf93aebd92893e72a0c4c48eadef092d0dc7e28fc1'
The fixed length result is the “hash value”, a.k.a. 
“checksum” or “digest”.
cacr.iu.edu/projects/swip/
Our Talk
● Problem Statement: Challenges 
to Data Integrity
● Our Approach: Adding 
integrity support to the popular 
Pegasus scientific workflow 
management system
● Challenges
● Next steps
cacr.iu.edu/projects/swip/
SWIP Goals
● Provide assurances that a workflow is not 
accidentally or maliciously altered during execution.
● Allow for detection of modification to its data or 
executables at later dates to facilitate reproducibility.
● Integrate cryptographic support for data integrity into 
the Pegasus WMS.
cacr.iu.edu/projects/swip/
Taking Advantage of Pegasus WMS
● Familiar interface to scientific projects (>700k Pegasus workflows from 
2013 to 2015).
● Integrity-checking is tedious and error-prone. A WMS system, with its 
understanding of data ingest and creation is a good place to handle 
these tasks.
● Manages provenance and metadata, which we can protect.
● Maps abstract workflow to computing infrastructure and with 
understanding of security needs can choose appropriate infrastructure or 
even re-configure it.
cacr.iu.edu/projects/swip/
Pegasus Workflow Management System
Discover what resources (computation, data, software) are available
Select the appropriate resources based on a architecture, availability of 
software, performance, reliability, availability of cycles, storage,..
Devise a plan:
What resources to use
How to best adapt the workflow to the resources
What protocols to use to access the data, to schedule jobs
What data to save
Execute the plan
In a reliable way
Keep track of what data was accessed, generated and how
Outside of the WMS functions
Resource provisioning
cacr.iu.edu/projects/swip/
Key Pegasus benefits
Portability across heterogeneous infrastructure
Separation of workflow description and execution
Support for campus and leadership class clusters, OSG, XSEDE, academic and 
commercial clouds
Can interact with a number of different storage systems (with different protocols)
Supports data reuse– useful in collaborations and ensemble workflow runs
Reliability
Recover from failures, retry, workflow-level checkpointing
Scalability
O(million) task, O(TB) data in a workflow
Restructures workflow for performance
Web-based monitoring and debugging tools
Can be included in various user-facing infrastructures
(Graphical composition tools, Portals, HUBZero)
Open source, available on github
cacr.iu.edu/projects/swip/
Workflow Execution Challenges
and Capabilities
Failures in the execution environment or application
Workflow-level checkpointing
Retries
Resubmit the workflow onto different resources (pick up where you left off)
Data storage limitations on execution sites
Clean up data as you go along (automatically adds nodes to workflow)
Performance
Small workflow tasks
Task clustering, pilot jobs
Data reuse
Heterogeneous execution architectures
Specialized execution engines
Support for a variety of storage layouts
Support for most data transfer protocols
cacr.iu.edu/projects/swip/
Pegasus, Production quality, In use since 2001
cacr.iu.edu/projects/swip/
Our Plan...
Workflow Management Systems (WMS) 
are great places to tackle data integrity.
They understand what data is created and 
ingested and do not mind tedious tasks 
such as generating and checking 
checksums. 
Pegasus WMS is widely used (LIGO, 
SCEC, SoyKB, Montage, etc.) by the 
scientific community and is the target of 
our improvements.
cacr.iu.edu/projects/swip/
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Challenges
Can we do more than know 
“something changed?”
Balance performance / integrity 
trade-off?
How do we handle storage without 
compute capabilities?
Are all errors in all types of data of 
equal concern?
Long data life: today’s cryptographic 
algorithms will probably not last as long 
as we need the science data.
E.g. what threats will Quantum computing bring?
When do we hit limits of cryptographic 
algorithms (collisions)?
   → Prof Steve Myers (Co-PI), IU SICE
cacr.iu.edu/projects/swip/
Today’s Limits
We are not modifying operating systems, libraries, and software outside of 
Pegasus – this limits the strength of the assurances we can provide.
E.g. Modification of system libraries could fool our integrity checks.
As we encounter these limitations we will document how a next generation CI 
and Hardware stack could address them.
E.g. through the use of trusted computing (Intel Secure Guard Extension, etc.)
cacr.iu.edu/projects/swip/
How do you know your integrity protection is working?
Imagine the following:
You finish adding integrity 
protection to your software. You run 
a workflow and all goes smoothly.
Was there no integrity problem or 
did you just fail to detect it?
How do you reliably and repeatedly 
test integrity protection?
cacr.iu.edu/projects/swip/
Enter the Chaos Jungle!
Inspired by Netflix’s Chaos Monkey.
https://github.com/Netflix/chaosmonkey
The RENCI ORCA software creates 
virtual infrastructure.
What if it created virtual infrastructure 
that intentionally corrupted data - 
randomly or predictably?
Now we can test how software runs 
under bad conditions.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tioman_Rainforest.JPG
cacr.iu.edu/projects/swip/
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Our three-year plan
Year one: Requirements analysis and prototyping   ⇦ we are here 
    
    See: https://github.com/IU-CACR/SWIP/blob/master/SWIP-Community-Use-Cases.pdf 
Year two: Iterate with partners to evaluate effectiveness and usability:
    LIGO, CyberShake, FreeSurfer, OSG, SPLINTER, Chameleon, NSFCloud
Year three: Complete transition to production through release in Pegasus and 
ORCA.
     Will release through existing open-source repositories and licenses.
https://cacr.iu.edu/projects/swip/
We thank the National Science Foundation for funding this work (Grants 
1642070, 1642053, 1642090). Views expressed may not necessarily be 
the views of the NSF. Thanks to Eli Dart for Brocade TSB details.
Thanks!
cacr.iu.edu/projects/swip/
cacr.iu.edu/projects/swip/
Practicing what we preach + research
http://download.pegasus.isi.edu/pegasus/4.7.4/sha256sums.txt    (current Release version)
e58352f89e8325b92d13cac996c029fdc7950b019ea17b9a71a41fadf9ec29a6  pegasus_4.7.4-1+deb7_amd64.deb
94750e8ef2cf381b6b0aaf68ab1412e3763098496b3e3f0b9a74719764ecbdb3  pegasus_4.7.4-1+deb8_amd64.deb
e0a15758815a21c7c1f296842dac079fb14eeb2db624f49f1973b2cd08495baf  pegasus-4.7.4-1.el6.x86_64.rpm
...
26257cfad6eb7e72507a53c49c74f15535ed87475d5fc6ddb9b71b20d8a5afb8  pegasus-worker-4.7.4-x86_rhel_6.tar.gz
cacr.iu.edu/projects/swip/
Concerns over hash functions
● Collisions, i.e., non-unique hashes
● Computational expense
● “Big data”
cacr.iu.edu
Today’s Limits
We are not modifying operating systems, libraries, and software outside of 
Pegasus – this limits the strength of the assurances we can provide.
E.g. Modification of system libraries could fool our integrity checks.
As we encounter these limitations we will document how a next generation CI 
and Hardware stack could address them.
E.g. through the use of trusted computing (Secure Guard Extension, etc.)
cacr.iu.edu/projects/swip/
Limitation of TCP Checksum with Big Data
TCP has a 16-bit checksum.
This means 1/65,536 packets 
will randomly have the same 
checksum.
So packet corruption is 
1/65,536 likely not to be 
detected by TCP checksum.
In 1999, Vern Paxson found 
corruption in 1/5000 packets.
V. Paxson, End-to-End Internet Packet Dynamics. IEEE/ACM Transactions on 
Networking, Vol.7, No.3, pp. 277-292, June 1999 
(http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=312234
Hence:
1/65,536 × 1/5000 =~ 1/300 million 
packets will get corrupted and not 
detected by the TCP checksum.
If we assume 1 kbytes / packet, a 
300GB transfer will have one 
undetected error.
